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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JEROME K. DUNCAN,
Case No. 950227-CA

Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

:
Priority No. 4

EILEEN M. HOWARD; SANDRA
THORDERSON and LARRY
THORDERSON; STATE OF UTAH,
Department of Human
Services,

:
:

Defendants/Appellants.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE DUNCAN

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3 (2) (I) (1953, as amended).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I.

DID THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY UPHOLD AND
APPLY THE STANDARD SET FORTH IN HUTCHISON
V. HUTCHISON, 649 P. 2d 38 (Utah 1982) IN
DETERMINING THAT THE PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE BE
AWARDED CUSTODY OF HIS NATURAL SON OVER THE
CHILD'S GRANDMOTHER AND STEP-GRANDFATHER?

Standard of Review: The standard of review to be applied
in custody cases is whether or not the trial court's holding
was clearly erroneous. See
1248

( Utah 1987) citing

(Utah 1987) and Ashton

Kishpaugh
Lemon

v.

Ashton,

v.

v.

Kishpaugh,

Coates,

745 P.2d

735 P.2d 58, 60

733 P.2d 147, 149-50 & n.l

(Utah 1987) . The weight that the trial court gives to the
various factors set forth in Hutchison

is to be reviewed under

an abuse of discretion standard. See Hutchison

v. Hutchison

at

41.
II.

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING THE
DEFENDANT'S/APPELLANT'S
MOTION
FOR
RECONSIDERATION?

Standard

of

Review.

In

considering

a

trial

court's

decision to deny a new trial this court will reverse only if
there is an abuse of discretion by the trial court.
v. Fire

Insurance

Exchange,

Crookston

860 P.2d 937 (Utah 1993) .

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action arose out of a paternity action filed by Mr.
Duncan, the plaintiff/appellee in 1991 for the purposes of
establishing that he was in fact the natural father of Clel
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Howard who was born on October 12, 1988. The paternity action
was filed after such time as the natural mother Eileen Howard,
refused visitation to Mr. Duncan on the basis of her claim
that he was not the father of the child. It was established
that Mr. Duncan was in fact the natural father of the child
and visitation resumed until April 7, 1992 at which time the
child went to Pennsylvania to live with Sandra and Larry
Thorderson, defendants/appellants, his maternal grandmother
and step-grandfather.
On or about February 2, 1993 Mr. Duncan filed a Motion
for Order to Show Cause in the Third Judicial District court,
Salt Lake County, asking for temporary custody of the child.
(R.

53) .

On

or

defendants/appellants

about

February

12,

1993

the

filed a petition for custody of the

child in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, State
of Pennsylvania where they obtained a custody order at that
time. A consultation between the Utah and Pennsylvania court
resulted in a decision that Utah would retain jurisdiction
over the matter of the custody of Clel Howard. (R. at 58, 64).
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The Thorderson's joined in as a defendant in the Utah action
at that time. (R. 95).
On or about June 17, 1993 a hearing was held on Mr.
Duncan's Order to Show Cause. It was held at that time that
the

child

would

remain

with

the

Thordersons

during

the

pendency of the action but that he would travel to Utah for a
one month visitation period. (R. 101-05) . Mr. Duncan, along
with his current wife did travel to Pennsylvania in order to
pick the child up for the one month visitation. Although the
child was initially not allowed to leave with the Duncans,
eventually the Duncans were able to transport the child back
to Utah for the period of visitation.
This matter went to trial before the Honorable Judge John
A. Rokich on or about September 28, 29 and 30 of 1994. After
taking

the

testimony

of

numerous

witnesses

including

therapists, the parties themselves and other family members of
the parties, the trial court applied the standard set forth in
Hutchison

v.

Hutchison,

649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982) and granted

custody of the minor child to the natural father Jerome Duncan
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subject to visitation rights of the appellants. The court
further ordered that the child be transferred to Utah in June
of 1995 after the completion of the current school year; that
the Duncans obtain a therapist for the child and that the
therapists work together in preparing the child for a change
in custody. Further, the child was to continue in therapy once
in Utah in order to aide him in his adjustment to living with
his father and step-mother. The defendants/appellants filed a
motion for reconsideration on or about December 12, 1994. The
trial court filed a minute entry on or about January 10, 1995
denying said motion. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law were entered by the trial court on or about February 8,
1995 and a timely notice of appeal was filed in this matter.
Custody of the minor child was transferred to Mr. and
Mrs. Duncan on or about June 25, 1995. The child has been in
therapy since that time with Dr. Chris K. Wehl. Visitation has
proceeded with the appellants, who have remained in Utah since
the transfer of custody, pursuant to the visitation schedule
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recommended by Dr. Wehl and approved by the trial court by
Amended Order in or about September of 1995.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Jerry Duncan, the natural father of Clel Howard, and
Eileen Howard, the natural mother of Clel, met in the Fall of
1987 at the Grand Canyon, North Rim where they were both
employed. (Trial Transcript at 77). At the end of the season
the couple moved to Cedar City, Utah where they moved into an
apartment together. Both of the parties obtained work at Brian
Head Ski Resort. After a period of approximately five months
Mr. Duncan got a job out of state and the parties split up.
See

id.

at 79. Shortly thereafter Mr. Duncan moved to Texas.

On or about January 17, 1989 Mr. Duncan received a letter in
Texas from Eileen Howard. The letter stated that Clel Howard
had been born on October 12, 1988 and that Mr. Duncan was the
father. At this time Mr. Duncan immediately quit his job in
Texas and returned to Utah. He also sent a check for $150.00
to Ms. Howard before leaving Texas for the support of their
son. See

id.

at 82-83.
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Upon moving back to Utah Mr. Duncan obtained employment
and began establishing a relationship with his young son. At
that

time

Clel

and

his

mother

were

living

with

the

defendants/appellants Mr. and Mrs. Thorderson. Over the next
few months Mr. Duncan continued to send support checks and
began visiting with the child. He attempted to visit the child
once a week but on some occasions the Thordersons would not
allow him to visit with Clel stating that he was taking a nap
or that the timing was bad. See id.

at 89. The Thordersons

would not allow Mr. Duncan to expand the visits or take Clel
overnight. See id.

at 104-05. During this same time period Mr.

Duncan also filed an acknowledgment of paternity with the
Department of Social Services. See

id.

In or about 1991 the

Thordersons moved to the state of Pennsylvania and Clel stayed
in Utah with his mother. During this time period Mr. Duncan
had

a

greater

amount

of

visitation

with

overnight visits and family outings. See id.

Clel

including

at 103.

In 1991 Mr. Duncan filed an action to establish paternity
in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County. At
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that time the child's mother was denying that Mr. Duncan was
the natural father of the child. After Mr. Duncan filed the
action to establish paternity the defendant/appellant Howard
cut off all visitation between Mr. Duncan and his son. See

id.

at 107. During the three month period it took to complete the
blood tests Mr. Duncan was not allowed to visit Clel. After
Mr. Duncan's paternity was established he discovered that Clel
and his mother

had gone to Pennsylvania to live with the

defendants/appellants Thordersons. See

id.

at 108. At this

time Mr. Duncan filed an action for visitation with his son.
The trial court granted visitation and Mr. Duncan flew the
child and his mother from Pennsylvania on two occasions during
the summer of 1992 in order to have visitation with his son.
See

id.

At the time of the second visit defendant/appellant

Howard decided to stay in Salt Lake with Clel. From that time
until Thanksgiving of 1992 Mr. Duncan had regular visitation
with his son including overnight visitation. See id.

at 111.

In November of 1992 Mr. Duncan was informed that Clel
would be going to Pennsylvania for the Holidays in order to
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visit the Thordersons. After Christmas of 1992 Clel Howard
unexpectedly did not return to Utah, but rather stayed in
Pennsylvania

with

the

defendants/appellants.

It was

this

action on the part of the defendants that led to the filing of
the complaint in this action on behalf of Mr. Duncan seeking
custody of his son. See id.

at 116-17.

In the Summer of 1993 Mr. and Mrs. Duncan traveled to
Pennsylvania to bring Clel to Utah for a one month visitation
per the order of Judge Rokich.1 Mr. Duncan was to pick the
child up on July 15, 1993 and transport him back to Utah for
the court ordered visitation. After arriving in Pennsylvania
the Thordersons refused to let Mr. Duncan take Clel and it was
not until

after a hearing was held on July 23, 1993

in

Pennsylvania that Mr. Duncan was allowed to take his son back
to Utah for the visitation. See id.

at 118-19. When Clel first

arrived in Utah he was somewhat anxious. He had some trouble
eating and getting to sleep. However, as his stay progressed
he appeared to improve. See id.

at 120-121. During this time

*Mr. Duncan married his current wife Diane Duncan on March 10,
1993.
9

Mr. Duncan had his son evaluated by Todd Otanez who prepared
a custody evaluation concluding that Mr. Duncan was the proper
party to have custody of the child. See id.

at 33-34. Although

Mr. Otanez was hired to do an evaluation comparing Mr. Duncan
to Ms. Howard, he stated at trial that he did meet with Mr.
and Mrs. Thorderson and took their position into account in
making his determination. See
far

as

to

state

that

one

id.
of

at 20. Mr. Otanez went so
the

reasons

that

he

was

recommending that custody go to Mr. Duncan as opposed to Ms.
Howard was that placing the child with Ms. Howard would be the
same as placing him with the Thordersons. See

id.

at 34. Mr.

Otanez testified at trial regarding Mr. Duncan's bond with the
child and his sensitivity to the child's needs. He testified
that Mr. Duncan had good parenting skills, that he tried very
hard to be

u

in tune to Clel's emotional needs", that he was

sensitive and that he had established a good bond with the
child.

See

id.

at 22-24. Mr. Otanez

further visited Mr.

Duncan's home and spoke with friends and relatives. Although
Mr. Otanez did not have the time to spend with the child that
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some

of

the other counselors had due

to logistics, he

completed a very thorough evaluation of the situation which
the trial court clearly took into consideration.
During the trial in this matter there was also lengthy
testimony from many of Mr. Duncan's family members. All of Mr.
Duncan's family testified about the close relationship between
Mr. Duncan and Clel when they were able to spend time
together. They further testified about the closeness of the
Duncan family in general and expressed their wish to have Clel
as a member of the extended family. See id.

at 169-330. Mr.

Duncan himself further testified about the emotional problems
that his son experiences. He testified regarding the efforts
he had gone to in order to find a therapist for Clel and
discussed his concern that Clel have one doctor he could work
with as opposed to many. See id.

at 122. Mr. Duncan testified

about the difficulty in reestablishing the bond with Clel
after lengthy separations and the steps he had taken to make
this

transition

easier.

See

id.

at

125-26. He

further

testified about his current wife and the fact that she and
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Clel have a very good and comfortable relationship. See id.

at

127. Lastly, Mr. Duncan testified regarding his financial and
living situation which appeared to be quite adequate for
raising a child. He testified that he and his wife would be
arranging their work schedules so one of them could be with
Clel at almost all times. The need for surrogate care was
virtually non-existent, however, Mr. Duncan testified that he
had made arrangements with a neighbor lady who ran a day care
in case the need were to arise. See id.

at 128-130.

During the course of the trial there was also testimony
from the defendants and their experts who all concluded that
the child should remain in Pennsylvania. This testimony was
based primarily on a best interest of the child standard
although there was some testimony that the defendants felt
that they had adequately rebutted the Hutchison

requirements

due to their belief that Mr. Duncan did not have a strong bond
with the child and did not understand his needs.
After the three day trial in this matter was concluded
Judge Rokich found that the defendants had not rebutted the
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presumption set forth in Hutchison
provide a good home

and that Mr. Duncan could

for the child. The trial court made

extensive Findings of Fact and concluded that custody was to
be awarded to Mr. Duncan. The defendants filed a motion for
reconsideration which the court denied on or about January 10,
1995. The final Findings were signed on or about February 8,
1995.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The

trial

court

in this matter properly

presumption set forth in Hutchison
(Utah,

1982)

in

awarding

v.

custody

Hutchison,
to

Mr.

applied

the

649 P.2d 38
Duncan,

the

plaintiff/appellee. The defendants in this matter did not
rebut the presumption that it is in the best interest of the
child to reside with a natural parent as opposed to a nonparent unless the non-parent demonstrates that there is no
strong mutual bond between the child and the parent, that the
parent has not demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice his or
her own interest and welfare for the child's, and that the
parent lacks the sympathy for and understanding of the child
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that is characteristic of parents generally. Only when these
standards are rebutted will the court then turn to an analysis
that depends
standard.

To

solely on the
argue

that

"best

this

interest

standard

the child77

of

was

rebutted

as

appellants Thorderson attempt to do, or that a "best interest
of the child77 standard should have been used in place of the
Hutchison

standard as appellant Howard attempts to do is

erroneous. Further, the case of State

ex rel.

H.R.V.,

278 Utah

Adv. Rep. 13 (Ut. Ct. App. 1995) is distinguishable on its
facts from the case at hand and does not change the standard
implemented by the court below. The trial court did not commit
error

in refusing

to grant

custody

to Eileen Howard

and

lastly, the trial court did not commit error in denying the
defendants/appellants motion for reconsideration.
ARGUMENT
I.

DID THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY UPHOLD AND
APPLY THE STANDARD SET FORTH IN HUTCHISON
V. HUTCHISON, 649 P. 2d 38 (Utah 1982) IN
DETERMINING THAT THE PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE BE
AWARDED CUSTODY OF HIS NATURAL SON OVER THE
CHILD'S GRANDMOTHER AND STEP-GRANDFATHER?

14

A. Standard of Review:
The standard of review to be applied in custody cases is
whether

or

not

the

trial

erroneous. See Kishpaugh
1987) citing
Ashton

v.

Lemon v. Coates,

v. Ashton,

court's

holding

Kishpaugh,

was

clearly

745 P.2d 1248 ( Utah

735 P.2d 58, 60 (Utah 1987) and

733 P.2d 147, 149-50 & n.l (Utah 1987). The

weight that the trial court gives to the various factors set
forth

in Hutchison

is to be

reviewed

discretion standard. See Hutchison

v.

under

Hutchison

an abuse of
at 41.

B. Discussion:
The case law in Utah developing the legal standards to be
used in determining the custody of a child is rather extensive
and has resulted in a body of law that gives trial courts
relatively clear guidelines on making these weighty decisions.
This Court and the Utah Supreme Court have also been willing
to

change

the

standards

previously

set

forth

in

custody

disputes in order to keep the best interest of the child in
mind. For many years Utah law presumed that all other things
being equal the mother was the preferred parent in custody

15

disputes. However in Pusey v. Pusey,

728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986)

the Utah Supreme Court determined that this presumption should
no longer apply because in many cases "all things being equal"
the father was still the most appropriate custodial parent. As
our society has changed over the past decade we are now faced
with situations where many children are not raised by two
parent families and custody disputes more often are between
not just parents but also extended family members or stepfamily. We are also unfortunately faced with the situation
many times where children are born out of wedlock resulting in
a situation where one of the natural parents may not be in the
position to establish the type of early bond with the child
that they would have otherwise. This is the situation that
faces this Court in the case of Clel Howard.
As is stated above, Clel Howard was born in October of
1988 as the result of a relationship between his mother,
Eileen Howard and his father, Jerry Duncan. Mr. Duncan was not
aware of the pregnancy, or the birth until some three months
after his son was born. As stated above, at this time he

16

immediately quit his job in Texas and returned to Utah so that
he could begin to establish a relationship with his son. He
paid child support and attempted to visit his young son as
much as he possibly could given the circumstances between
himself and the child's mother. He quickly discovered that not
only did he have to deal with the child's mother but that he
must also deal with the child's maternal grandmother and stepgrandfather because this is where the child was spending most
of

his

time. Even

though

it was

difficult

to

arrange

visitation, and the Thordersons would not allow overnight
visitation, Mr. Duncan always continued to build and maintain
a relationship with his son. After the Thordersons moved to
Pennsylvania this became easier due to the fact that the
child's mother allowed Mr. Duncan overnight and extended
visitation.
It

was

not

until

the

child

moved

to

Pennsylvania

permanently that Mr. Duncan began the process of trying to
seek custody of his son. By this time Mr. Duncan had remarried
and obtained steady employment. It became apparent at that
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time that the only way he would be able to establish the type
of relationship that he wanted with his son was by seeking
full custody of him. It was this background that lead to the
case at hand between Mr. Duncan, the Thordersons and Ms.
Howard.
In Hutchison

v.

Hutchison,

649 P.2d 38 (Utah, 1982), the

Utah Supreme Court set forth the standard to be used when
making

a

custody

determination

between

a

parent

nonparent.
In
a
controversy
over
custody,
the
paramount
consideration
is
the
best
interest of the child but where one party
to the controversy is a nonparent, there is
a presumption in favor of the natural
parent. Walton v. Coffman,
110 Utah 1, 169
P.2d 97 (1946). This presumption recognizes
"the natural right and authority of the
parent to the child's custody. . . ." State
in re Jennings,
20 Utah 2d 50, 52, 432 P.2d
879, 880 (1967). It is rooted in the common
experience of mankind, which teaches that
parent and child normally share a strong
attachment or bond for each other, that a
natural parent will normally sacrifice
personal interest and welfare for the
child's benefit, and that a natural parent
is
normally
more
sympathetic
and
understanding and better able to win the
confidence and love of the child than

18

and

a

anyone else. Walton v. Coffman,
13, 169 P.2d at 103.
Id.

110 Utah at

at 40. Although the Utah Supreme Court was clear on the

fact that residing with a natural parent should be presumed to
be in the best interest of the child they did set forth that
the presumption is not conclusive. It is accurate that there
may be situations where a nonparent is the better custodian of
the child, however, this presumption is not easily rebutted.
The appellants in this case go to great length to argue that
the Thordersons, or Eileen Howard and the Thordersons combined
are the better parents in this case because they are the ones
that have had this child for a significant portion of his
life. They argue that the appellants have a deeper love for
this child than the father, that they are more sensitive to
his needs and that they are in a better position financially
to provide for this child. The Hutchison

Court makes it clear

that this is not enough to overcome the presumption in favor
of the natural parent.
The parental presumption is not conclusive,
. . . but it cannot be rebutted merely by
demonstrating that the opposing party
19

possesses superior qualifications, has
established a deeper bond with the child,
or is able to provide more desirable
circumstances. If the presumption could be
rebutted
merely
by
evidence
that
a
nonparent would be a superior custodian,
the parent's natural right to custody could
be rendered illusory and with it the
child's natural right to be reared, where
possible, by his or her natural parent.
Id.

at 41.
This is a particularly important consideration in cases

like

the

one

at hand where

the natural

parent

has been

deprived of the ability to rear his child through no fault of
his own. When a child is born out of wedlock it is typical
that the child not live with the natural father during his or
her early years. In this case Mr. Duncan quit his job in Texas
immediately upon learning of the birth of his son and moved to
Utah so that he could establish a relationship with the child.
The fact that the natural mother in this case chose to abandon
the

child

leaving

him

primarily

in

the

care

of

his

grandparents plays no part in rebutting the presumption that
rightfully belongs to Mr. Duncan.

20

In order for a nonparent to rebut the presumption they
must rebut three characteristics set forth by the court. Only
when the non-parent demonstrates by evidence that the natural
parent lacks all three of these characteristics will the
presumption be rebutted and then the "contestants for custody
compete on equal footing, and the custody award should be
determined solely by reference to the best interest of the
child." Id.
demonstrated

at 41. The three characteristics which must be
by

the

nonparent

in

order

to

rebut

the

presumption are that 1) no strong mutual bond exists between
the child and the natural parent, 2) the natural parent has
not demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice his or her own
interest and welfare for the child's, and 3) that the natural
parent lacks the sympathy for and understanding of the child
that is characteristic of parents generally. The appellants in
this

matter

did

plaintiff/appellee

not

demonstrate

by

evidence

that

the

lacked these three characteristics and

therefore the trial court was proper in its ruling that the
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best interest of the child in this case was served by awarding
custody to Mr. Duncan, the child's natural father.
A.

The Appellants Pid Not Demonstrate
That A Bond Does Not Exist Between the
Child And His Natural Father.

Mr. Duncan did in fact establish a bond with his son in
spite of the obstacles that he was faced with. During the
trial there was testimony from numerous witnesses who were
able to speak about the relationship between Mr. Duncan and
Clel. Kenneth Duncan, Mr. Duncan's brother testified about
interactions he had observed between the appellee and his son.
He testified that Mr. Duncan had brought Clel to many family
activities and that their interactions were very typical of
any father and son. (Trial Transcript at 171). He testified
that Mr. Duncan and Clel would ride bikes together and that
Mr. Duncan was exceptionally loving and tender towards his
son. See id.

He further testified that when Clel was not with

his father that Mr. Duncan would speak of him often and show
pictures to the family. See id.

at 172. He testified that Clel

always seemed to be having fun when he was around the family
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and

in fact

it was almost

surprising

that

the

situation

appeared so normal and that Clel was so close and loving with
the extended family given his limited opportunities to spend
time with them. See id.

at 173-74.

The trial court also heard testimony from Peggy Duncan,
Mr. Duncan's sister-in-law who testified that Mr. Duncan had
brought Clel to visit almost every time he had him in his
custody. She testified that Clel was shy when he was little
and that his father would stay right with him and get down on
the floor and play with him and was always very excited to
have Clel with him. She further testified that Clel appeared
just as excited to be with his father. See id.

at 182. She

also testified that she thought it was amazing that Clel
appeared so comfortable around his father given the fact that
they were not able to see each other very often. See

id.

at

183.
Mr. Duncan's brother Stuart Duncan also testified at
trial regarding the relationship between the plaintiff and his
son. He testified that Mr. Duncan was a very good father,
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always very concerned about his son. He further testified that
the relationship between Clel and his father appeared to be
quite normal and that Clel would always go to his father first
if he needed something. He testified that Mr. Duncan was good
at disciplining Clel and that when Clel was not with him he
spoke of him all the time. See

id.

at 320.

The appellants point out that the experts in this case
testified that there was a stronger bond between the child and
the Thordersons than between the child and his father. Given
the fact that this child had spent most of his life in the
home of the Thordersons it would make sense that his primary
bond would exist with them. However, the fact that they may
have

a

stronger bond

with

the

child

does not

rebut

the

question of whether or not the father also has a bond with the
child. Mr. Otanez testified that Mr. Duncan did in fact have
a bond with his child. See id.

at 27. Mr. Otanez did point out

that Mr. Duncan had not had the opportunity to establish the
type of bond with his son that one might normally expect but
that it was clear he wanted custody of his son for "no other
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reason except that he has that desire, that responsibility in
his mind to protect and care and love his son." Id.

Mr. Otanez

further testified that it appeared to him that Clel made
negative comments about his father because he knew that he was
not supposed to have a good time when he was with his father.
Id.

at 26. However, when Clel didn't know he was being watched

he would laugh and play with his father in a normal manner.
Id.

The appellants Thordersons point out testimony of Steven
Richfield and Bryne Rivlin. Ms. Rivlin testified that the
appellants

were

distrustful

of Mr. Duncan.

She

further

testified however, that Mr. Duncan was very appreciative of
the Thordersons taking care of his son and felt that they were
good people. She testified that Mr. Duncan had attempted to
maintain contact with his son while Clel was in Pennsylvania
but felt that the Thordersons had thwarted that effort. See
id.

at 231. Ms. Rivlin also testified that Mr. Duncan told her

that Clel behaved differently when the Thordersons were not
there and that he was afraid to show love to his father in
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front of the Thordersons. See id.

at 233. Although Dr.

Richfield testified that the child's psychological bond was
with the Thordersons he also testified that Mr. Duncan was
establishing a bond with his son. See id.

at 417.

Based upon the testimony the trial court found that
although the child's strongest bond was with the Thordersons,
that Mr. Duncan's bonding with the child had been hampered
because he had not had the opportunities to establish a bond
in the way that the Thordersons had. The court found that Mr.
Duncan had met with much resistance in establishing a close
relationship with his son and that all of the evidence in the
case established that a bond did exist between father and son
and led the court to believe that a strong bond could and
would be established if the opportunity was available. Based
upon the court's findings regarding this issue it is clear
that the court considered the testimony and found that the
appellants

did

not

demonstrate

the

first

characteristic

necessary to rebut the presumption set forth in

26

Hutchison.

B.

The Appellants Did Not Demonstrate
That Mr. Duncan Was Not Willing To
Sacrifice His Own Interest And Welfare
For That Of The Child,

It is clear from the evidence presented at trial that Mr.
Duncan has and continues to sacrifice his own interests and
welfare for that of his child. Mr. Duncan began sacrificing
for his child immediately upon learning of his birth by
quitting his job and moving to Utah in order that he could be
close to the child. Further, upon learning of the birth of his
child he sent a check to Ms. Howard and has continued to pay
support on behalf of this child even though there has never
been a court order in place directing him to do so. (Trial
Transcript at 82) . Upon returning to Utah, even though Mr.
Duncan was faced with obstacles in establishing a relationship
with his son he continued to have as much contact with the
child as possible. By reviewing the testimony it becomes
apparent that there has never been a period in this child's
life when his father did not continue to try and build a
relationship with him. Even when the child was moved to
Pennsylvania, Mr. Duncan paid for the child and his mother to
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return to Utah for visits and even drove to Pennsylvania on
one occasion to pick the child up and drive him back to Utah
for visitation. See

id.

at 108-120.

Mr. Duncan voluntarily registered his paternity with the
state and underwent blood tests when Ms. Howard refused to
recognize him as the father. See

id.

at 107. Mr. Duncan has

hired numerous therapists to try and help him deal with the
problems of his son both before and after the transfer of
custody. No one in this case testified that Mr. Duncan's
motives in seeking custody of his son were anything but pure.
The simple fact that Mr. Duncan has gone to the time and
expense

of

a

trial

and

now

an

appeal

in

this

matter

demonstrates that he is willing to sacrifice for the interest
of his son. Further, Mr. Duncan testified at trial that if he
were awarded custody of his son he and his current wife would
change their job schedules so someone could be home with Clel
at all times even though this would mean spending much less
time with each other. See

id.

at 128-130.
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The evidence presented at trial was overwhelming that Mr.
Duncan has in fact sacrificed his interests and welfare for
his son. The only testimony to the contrary was from the
Thordersons and Eileen Howard. The trial court, who is in the
best position to weigh the credibility of the witnesses found
that Mr. Duncan had ''demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice
his own interest and welfare for the child's." The court
further found that u[i]t is evident that plaintiff cared about
Clel and is willing to sacrifice his own interests for the
child's, however, the defendants were not cooperative and did
not

further

a

father/son

relationship

between

Clel

and

plaintiff." (Memorandum Decision at 5 ) .
C.

The Appellants Did Not Demonstrate
That Mr. Duncan Lacks Sympathy For And
Understanding Of His Son,

The third characteristic set forth in Hutchison

is that

the nonparent must demonstrate that the natural parent lacks
sympathy and understanding for the minor child. The appellants
in this matter did not meet this requirement in order to rebut
the presumption that the best interest of the child is in
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being with his natural parent. The appellants argue that Mr.
Duncan does not have an understanding

of Clel's unique

emotional and psychological problems and that a change in
custody will damage this child forever. The evidence presented
at

trial

showed

that Mr. Duncan does

in fact have an

understanding of his child's unique situation and the trial
court found as such.
Mr. Duncan has put much time in effort into dealing with
the problems faced by his son. He has always been willing to
consult with therapists chosen by the appellants and has
further

consulted

numerous

therapists

on

his

own.

The

testimony at trial did not show anything different. The only
comment about Mr. Duncan's lack of cooperation came from Mr.
Stewart Smith who testified that the plaintiff had said he did
not want to take a lengthy personality test although he did
consent

to

a

shorter

version

of

the

test.

(See Trial

Transcript at 368) . It is important to note that Mr. Smith
spent a limited amount of time in this case only seeing the
participants for a total of nine hours. Even with this limited
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contact however he did testify that the interactions between
father and son were good although awkward because they all
took place in his office. See
The

appellants

also

id.

cite

at 360, 362-63).
to

Dr.

Richfield

for

the

proposition that the plaintiff lacks sympathy for his son.
Interestingly, even Dr. Richfield was willing to state that
many of the problems faced by this child come from the fact
that

he was abandoned by his mother,

Eileen Howard. See id.

defendant/appellant

at 419, 451-52. Further, Dr. Richfield

was not hired to perform a custody evaluation in this case,
rather he was hired by the Thordersons as a therapist for
Clel. Dr. Richfield testified that he was not able to make any
judgment

on

Mr.

Duncan's

parenting

abilities

and

his

recommendation that the Thordersons retain custody was based
on the fact that it would be detrimental to remove this child
from his present environment.2 See

2

id.

at 450.

It is of interest to note that Clel Howard's current
therapist, Dr. Chris Wehl believes that the emotional problems
suffered by this child are no greater than any other child in this
situation.
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After hearing the testimony in this matter the trial
court found that there was no significant evidence that the
plaintiff lacked the sympathy and understanding of the child
that is characteristic of parents generally. If fact, the
trial court further found that

"plaintiff understands the

problems that have been created by Clel being born out of
wedlock, the abandonment of Clel by his mother, and the lack
of regular visitation by him with Clel." (Memorandum Decision
at 5) .

D.

The Court Did Not Err in its Refusal
T Q Place The Parties On Equal Footing

And Rely On A Strict Best Interest Of
The Child Standard.
The appellants in this case argue that the trial court
did not implement a best interest of the child standard in
determining custody and they go on to cite numerous cases
which outline

the

issues

to be considered when making a

determination regarding the best interest of the child. The
trial

court

in the matter

did

in fact

implement

a best

interest of the child standard as is required in Hutchison
Hutchison,

649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982) . However, under
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v.

Hutchison

it is presumed that the best interest of the child lies in
being placed with a natural parent over a non-parent unless
the non-parent rebuts that presumption as discussed above. The
trial court found that the Thordersons did not rebut this
presumption and therefore the best interest of the child was
in being placed with his natural father. It is only after that
presumption is rebutted that "the contestants for custody
compete on equal footing, and the custody award should be
determined solely by reference to the best interests of the
child."

Id.

at

40. As

discussed

at

length

above

the

Thordersons clearly did not rebut this presumption.
Both appellants Thorderson and Howard rely heavily on the
case Tuckey

v. Tuckey,

649 P.2d 88 (Utah 1982) which was

issued almost simultaneously with the Hutchison

decision.

Appellants rely on this case for the proposition that there
may be circumstances where the best interest of the child lies
in being placed with the child's grandparents. Although this
proposition is undoubtedly true, the appellants completely
ignore the fact that the Supreme Court of Utah remanded the
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Tuckey

case in order that the trial court could make findings

regarding the presumption set forth in Hutchison.

In the

Tuckey case the natural mother was fighting for custody of her
two children with the paternal grandparents. The trial court
found that both the mother and grandparents were fit but
awarded custody to the mother. The grandparents appealed
arguing that the proper standard to be applied was the best
interest of the child notwithstanding the relative fitness of
the parties. The Utah Supreme Court reversed and remanded
holding that the trial court had made no findings regarding
whether or not the grandparents had rebutted the

Hutchison

presumption. The Court held that u[w]ithout specific findings,
we cannot properly review the trial court's order. . . ."
Tuckey at 90. Only if the presumption had been rebutted would
the best interest of the child standard be implemented in the
way requested by the grandparents. In the case at hand the
trial court made lengthy and specific findings regarding the
Hutchison

presumption concluding that the grandparents had not

rebutted the presumption and the best interest of the child
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was in having custody placed with Mr. Duncan, his natural
father.
The appellants cite numerous other cases in support of
their proposition that the trial court should have implemented
solely a best interest of the child standard, however, all of
these cases are factually distinguishable from the one at
hand. In Paryzek

v. Paryzek,

176 P.2d 78 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)

the custody dispute was between two natural parents and the
children had been living with the father. The trial court
granted

custody to the mother. This Court

reversed and

remanded holding that when the call is a close one maintaining
the

present

stable

environment

consideration. The Hutchison

should

be

taken

into

presumption was not an issue in

this case.
In both Moon v. Moon, 790 P. 2d 52 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
and Sukin

v. Sukin,

842 P.2d 922 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) relied

on by the appellants the custody dispute was between the
natural mother and the natural father. This Court held that
the trial court must make specific and detailed findings of
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fact in awarding custody in these situations and remanded so
that could be accomplished in the Sukin

case and found that

the trial court had adequately accomplished this in the Moon
matter.
The appellants further cite to the recent case of
ex re.

H.R.V.,

State

278 Adv. Rep. 13 (Ct. App. 11/22/95). This case

is also distinguishable from the case at hand. Appellants
argue that the H.R.V.

decision does away with the parental

presumption set forth in Hutchison

v.

Hutchison,

649 P.2d 38

(Utah 1982), in the situation where the natural parent does
not already have custody of the minor child. This is a serious
misreading of H.R.V.

What the H.R.V.

court in fact held was

that a natural parent who had already

lost custody to a

nonparent could not then rely on the parental presumption in
attempting to get custody back. In H.R.V.

Legal custody had

already been granted to the minor children's paternal aunt. It
had

already been determined

by

the trial

court

that

the

natural father should not have custody of the children. The
natural father then brought a petition to change custody. In

36

that

petition

presumption.

he
This

attempted
Court

to

held

rely
that

upon

the

parental

"once

the

parental

presumption has been rebutted or lost, and the natural parent
has been deprived of custody, that parent is not entitled to
reassert the parental presumption at a later date unless
custody has since been restored to the parent. Id.

at 15. This

is clearly distinguishable from the case at hand. Mr. Duncan
never lost custody of his son nor did the appellants ever
rebut the presumption and gain custody of the child. This
child was born out of wedlock and Mr. Duncan never had an
opportunity to have custody of the child before now although
he did provide support for the child and exercised visitation
with the child. This was Mr. Duncan's first opportunity to
rely on the parental presumption since he was never found to
be an unfit parent and never lost custody of the child. For
the appellants to argue that Mr. Duncan should not be awarded
this presumption because through no fault of his own the child
had never lived with him borders on bad faith.
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E.

The Trial
Reversible

Court
ExxQT

Did Not
Commit
In Refusing I Q

Consider Any Type Of Custody Award
Involving Howard,
Eileen Howard, defendant/appellant, the natural mother of
Clel Howard has maintained since the beginning of this matter
that she in not interested in having custody of her son and it
is her wish that custody be placed with her parents the
Thordersons. It was not reversible error for the trial court
in this matter to state that custody would not be granted to
appellant Howard. The testimony at trial was consistent from
all the experts on the point that Ms. Howard was not the
appropriate person to have custody of the child. Mr. Todd
Otanez testified that Ms. Howard made it very clear during his
evaluation that "she had no intentions of being the primary
caretaker of her son." (Trial Transcript at 30). Mr. Otanez
further testified that when he questioned Ms. Howard about her
feelings

on being

"depressing". Id.

a parent

to her

son her

response

was

Mr. Otanez also stated that raising a child

was not what Ms Howard had in mind for her life at this time.
See id. at 31.
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Ms. Bryne Rivlin, a social worker who also evaluated the
parties testified that she had only visited with Ms. Howard on
two occasions but that there did not appear to be much bonding
between Clel and his mother. See

id.

at 238-39. Ms. Rivlin

further testified that Ms. Howard had expressed to her that
she wanted Clel to remain with the Thordersons and that she
was not able to take care of him. See id.

at 256-57. Mr.

Steward Smith, a social worker who had some limited contact
with the parties in this matter testified that Ms. Howard's
leaving the child at an early age was a contributing factor to
his emotional problems Id.

at 3 91, and as stated above Dr.

Steven Richfield testified that many of the problems faced by
the child were a result of his abandonment by his mother. See
id.

At 419, 451-52. Dr. Richfield further testified that the

relationship between Ms. Howard and her son was peripheral and
that Ms. Howard had difficulties with "attunement to Clel's
emotional needs." Id.

at 419. Dr. Richfield also testified

that it was clear that Clel was not the uppermost priority in
Ms. Howard's life. See id.

at 426.
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Ms. Howard herself testified that she had never been the
primary caretaker of her son Id.

at 542. Ms. Howard further

testified that when her son came to Utah for visitation with
his father in the summer of 1993 that even though she was
living here she did not have visitation with the child because
she was not able to handle him without her mother. See id.

at

558. Ms. Howard also testified that if she were to have
custody of Clel that she would continue to live with the
Thordersons who would remain the primary caretakers. See

id.

at 566.
Appellant Howard argues that the trial court made the
determination that she would not be given custody of the child
without hearing any of the evidence. One can tell be reviewing
the record below that this simply is not the case. During the
cross examination of Ms. Howard the following exchange took
place:
Mr. Ellis:

You mentioned that if you were
awarded custody it would not be
your intention to move away (from
the
Thordersons) ;
is
that
correct?
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Ms. Howard:

Correct.

The Court:

Counsel, look, that's not an issue
here,
custody.
I have
had
the
therapists testify, the mother testify
about custody. Let's not put this
woman through that. It's hard enough
for
her now. Not
one
of
them
recommended that she have custody. Dr.
Richfield said, no, she wasn't. Her
mother said she wasn't. So I don't
know why we're putting this woman
through this.

(Trial Transcript at 566). During closing argument a further
exchange took place between plaintiff's counsel and the court
regarding

the

possibility

of

custody

being

awarded

defendant/appellant Eileen Howard:
Mr. Ellis:

. . . comparing the parents it appears
from the evidence and, we think the
court can see that the only realistic
choice is to award custody of that
child to his father, the only parent
that has his own home, and can provide
stability.
And
frankly,
for
the
important
reasons, I believe that awarding
custody to the mother, in this case
would be essentially equivalent to
awarding custody--

The Court:

That's a finding I'll make right now
so nobody has to argue that. I would
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to

not award custody to the natural
mother. That has come across loud and
clear, and in good conscience I could
not do that.

Id.

Mr. Ellis:

Thank you, Your Honor,

The Court:

So that's a finding I'm making.

at 575.
It simply is not accurate that the trial court made a

legal error by refusing to grant custody to appellant Howard.
The transcript is clear that all of the experts testified that
she was not the appropriate person to be awarded custody and
that the court did not make this final determination until
after hearing the testimony.
II. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR
DEFENDANT'S/APPELLANT' S
RECONSIDERATION?

IN DENYING THE
MOTION
FOR

Standard of Review:
The standard of review for a motion for reconsideration
is the same as would be implemented in considering a trial
court's decision to deny a new trial. This court will reverse
only if there is an abuse of discretion by the trial court.
Watkiss

& Campbell

v.

FOA son,

808 P. 2d 1061 (Utah 1991) and
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Crookston

v. Fire

Insurance

Exchange,

860 P. 2d 937 (Utah

1993).
Discussion:
The

appellants

in

this

case

filed

a

"Motion

for

Reconsideration" on or about December 12, 1994 prior to a
final order being entered by the trial court. In a Minute
Entry

dated

January

10,

1995

the

trial

court

denied

appellant's motion. It was not an abuse of discretion for the
trial court to deny such a motion.
Although it is accurate that a judge is free to change
his or her mind on the outcome of a case prior to a final
decision being rendered, the rules of procedure make no
provision for a ''motion for reconsideration" . The appellants
claim that such a motion is allowed under Rule 59 of the Utah
Rules

of Civil

Procedure,

however, the Supreme Court of Utah

has already held that provisions for such a motion do not
exist. See Watkiss

& Campbell

v.

FOA & Son,

808 P. 2d 1061

(Utah 1991). Rule 59 which is relied upon by the appellants
states as follows:
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(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of
Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all
or any of the parties and on all or part of
the issues, for any of the following
causes; provided, however, that on a motion
for a new trial in an action tried without
a jury, the court may open the judgment if
one has been entered, take additional
testimony, amend findings of fact and
conclusions of law or make new findings and
conclusions, and direct the entry of a new
j udgment:
The rule then goes on to list some of the causes that may
result in a new trial such as newly discovered evidence,
excessive

or

inadequate

damages,

irregularity

in

the

proceedings of the court to name a few. Nowhere does this rule
provide for a "motion for reconsideration" . The Utah Supreme
Court has held as follows regarding the reasons why motions to
reconsider are inappropriate:
If the party ruled against were permitted
to go beyond the rules, make a motion for
reconsideration, and persuade the judge to
reverse himself, the question arises, why
should not the other party who is now ruled
against be permitted to make a motion for
re-reconsideration asking the court to
again reverse himself? Tenacious litigants
and lawyers might persist in motions,
arguments and pressures and theoretically
a judge could go on reversing himself
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periodically at the entreaties of one or
the other of the parties ad infinitum.
Watkiss

& Campbell

at 1064.

The motion that the appellants should have filed in this
matter is a motion for a new trial. However, regardless of
what one calls the motion the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying it. The motion was filed December 12,
1994. The trial court did not deny the motion until January
10, 1995. With the passing of almost a full month before the
Minute Entry it is difficult to say that Judge Rokich did not
consider the motion of the appellants. There is no requirement
that a judge must make findings as to why a motion for new
trial, or in this case reconsideration, was denied. It is
within the judge's full discretion to either grant or deny the
motion as he or she sees fit. The trial court in this matter
was in the best position to review the evidence and to weigh
the credibility of the witnesses. It is clear from both the
trial

transcript

and

the

court's

Finding

of

Fact

and

Conclusions of Law that this was a difficult case and much
consideration was given to its outcome. It is further clear by
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looking at the time that passed between the end of trial and
a final judgment being entered by the court that Judge Rokich
did not make this decision lightly and most certainly did not
commit an abuse of discretion.
CQNCLUglQN
The

trial

court

in this matter properly applied

the

presumption that the best interest of the child lies in being
placed with a natural parent over a non-parent. The trial
court made complete and detailed findings that the appellant
did not rebut this presumption and properly awarded custody to
the plaintiff, Mr. Duncan. Further, the trial court did not
commit error in refusing to place custody with the natural
mother based upon the testimony at trial and lastly the trial
court

did

not

commit

an

abuse

of

discretion

in

denying

appellants Motion for Reconsideration. The appellee in this
matter

respectfully

requests

that

this

Court

affirm

the

opinion of the trial court in its entirety.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ ? — day of February, 1996.

WENDY M/ LEWIS
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
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